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 2 
Introduction 
British and French unemployment policy in the 1990s is often seen as being ‘worlds 
apart’, a product of diametrically and unambiguously opposed reactions to the 
changed international economic environment since the mid-1970s. As we describe in 
section 1 of this paper, their different approaches to unemployment policy are seen as 
resting on contrasting patterns of labour market reform, themselves a reflection of the 
different values which determine political choices in each state. Section 2 first shows 
how some trends in unemployment and employment in the two countries over the 
1990s appear to lend credence to this notion of ‘two worlds’. However, a more 
complicated picture emerges once we get behind the headline figures, and furthermore 
has its corollary in the counterintuitive trends which emerge from a more detailed 
examination of employment regulation. When we look in turn more closely at 
unemployment policy, in section 3, we see that it too manifests less the antithetical 
trends that would confirm a politics based on opposing values than subtle differences 
which appear to owe much to the diverse political consequences of varying 
institutional legacies. 
 
1. Britain versus France: a tale of two regulatory trinities 
The conventional opposition between British and French responses to slower growth 
and rising unemployment can be presented in terms of their different combinations of 
three features of public policy and politics in the interlocking domains of labour 
market adjustment and unemployment protection. To Britain’s junction of 
deregulation - workfare - individualism is contrasted France’s triad of regulation - 
social treatment of unemployment - solidarity. The values on the three variables – 
labour market regulation, unemployment policy and polity values – are seen to 
coalesce and complement each other in stable ‘regulatory trinities’. 
 
Labour market regulation 
A recent overview of labour market policy in Europe suggested that Britain is the 
closest approximation to complete deregulation in Western Europe, while France is 
the continent’s best example of regulatory stasis (Lodivici, 2000:45). Where for 
France we can speak of the ‘deregulation that never existed’ (Malo et. al., 2000), and 
even note the introduction of new ‘rigidities’, controversy in Britain tends to centre on 
whether the changes which have intervened since the early 1980s should be seen as a 
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‘river crossing’ or a ‘cold bath’ (Deakin and Reed, 2000), but not on the reality or 
direction of changes. Recent attempts to construct synthetic indicators of levels of 
labour market regulation would indeed suggest that Britain today has a profile of 
labour market regulation which is much closer to the United States than it to France or 
Germany (OECD 1999, Lodivici, 2000). 
 
These differences are reproduced in political discourse on the economy. Flexibility is 
a notoriously unpopular idea among French policy makers who, if they venture onto 
the dangerous territory of labour market deregulation, have long limited themselves to 
timid calls for souplesse. At the Stockholm European Council of March 2001, Tony 
Blair’s standard plea for greater flexibility in the interests of employment growth were 
countered by a co-ordinated response from France’s cohabiting Prime Minister Jospin 
and President Chirac who, with a single voice which belied any underlying 
ideological affiliations, insisted on the need for new employment in Europe to be “of 
quality” and “correctly remunerated”. 
 
Unemployment protection 
The respective areas of unemployment compensation is closely coupled to this picture 
of the contrasting evolution of labour market regulation. In this perspective, the 
diverging structure of the labour market has bequeathed different ‘regulatory 
dilemmas’ to which classical policies for unemployment protection have responded.  
 
In Britain, the main regulatory dilemma has been the limited attractiveness of new 
employment opportunities which, in the more flexible labour market, are often low-
paying and insecure. There have therefore been pressures to increase the financial 
incentives related to employment, which has been achieved most crudely by simply 
scaling-back entitlement to unemployment protection. Earnings-related supplements 
to unemployment benefits were an early victim of Thatcherism, and the old basic 
unemployment benefit was subject to repeated cuts and more restrictive entitlement 
conditions in the 1980s and 1990s (Atkinson and Micklewright 1989; Clasen, 2001). 
The introduction of the Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) in 1996 can be seen as the end-
point of this process of retrenchment motivated principally by the twin aims of 
containing social security spending and enhancing job search requirements. Propping-
up the peripheral labour market also passed by shifting a large part of the burden of 
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existing social expenditure towards means-tested, in-work benefits and tax-based 
wage subsidies (Family Credit, then Working Family Tax Credit), which act to 
subsidise low-incomes for working individuals and families. This social security 
strategy has been called “market workfare” (Grover and Stewart, 1999). It has been 
accompanied by the re-deployment of employment services and training initiatives, 
which have followed their own “workfarist progression” towards enforcing labour 
market discipline through a raft of compulsory job-search, training and employment 
preparation initiatives (Jones, 1996:138). 
 
The very differently connoted notion at the centre of French debates has been the 
‘social treatment’ of unemployment (le traitement social du chômage). This appears 
as explicit recognition of the fact that the main regulatory dilemma posed by France’s 
resistance of greater wage flexibility in the labour market will be the existence of 
important levels of unemployment, which it is necessary to ‘treat’, socially and 
humanly. One important instrument for this has been the French system of 
straightforward unemployment compensation, which Jacques Chirac, then Prime 
Minister, was already lauding in 1974 as the ‘best in the world’. This declaration 
followed the passage of a reform which had established a special 90% rate of 
unemployment benefit, the allocation supplémentaire d’attente (ASA), for those 
made redundant under particular conditions. While the ASA did not survive the 
worsening of the economic climate in the late 1970s, benefits for the French 
unemployed do seem to have remained considerably more generous than those of 
their British counterparts, in terms of both their level and their duration. In 1997, the 
median replacement rate of unemployment benefits in France was 56% of previous 
income, while the equivalent figure for the flat-rate British benefits can be calculated 
at around 25%. While benefits under the JSA regime are paid without a means-test for 
a maximum of 6 months in Britain, the duration of benefit entitlement can be as high 
as 5 years in France, notably for the older unemployed (Holcman, 1997:45). This sees 
unemployment benefit provision overlapping in important ways with early retirement 
measures, another important mechanism in France’s strategy of social treatment and 
even more clear evidence of the strategy of removing less productive workers from 
the labour force. Early retirement measures consistently took up 15-25% of labour 
market policy expenditure in the 1980s (Join-Lambert, 1997). 
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Dominant values 
The third pillar of the regulatory trinity is supplied by the different values which are 
held to underpin labour market and unemployment policy in Britain and France. 
These values influence voters’ responses to social phenomena, cementing the very 
understanding of regulatory dilemmas, and thus determining the legitimacy of policy 
initiatives in the domain of labour market regulation and unemployment. 
 
In Britain, it is a classically liberal individualism which is seen to dominate policy 
discussions of labour market phenomena. Individualism legitimates increased 
competitiveness, in the labour market as elsewhere, and accords badly with union 
demands for either collectively negotiated or legislative safeguards. Coupled with 
traumatic memories of the industrial disputes of the 1970s, individualism thus 
legitimised the Thatcher administration’s labelling of the trade union movement as 
‘the enemy within’, and facilitated the dismantling of the union’s workplace 
prerogatives, and the overriding of their demands and preferences in national policy 
(Graham, 1997). 
 
By contrast, in France, the very low formal strength of the trade union movement 
(whose rates of membership are the lowest in Europe) seems to be compensated by a 
widespread public sympathy, or solidarity, with their demands. A recent study of 
public attitudes towards unions concluded that, in spite of its weaknesses, internal 
divisions and petty rivalries, the French labour movement enjoys across society a 
“real and in some dimensions consensual legitimacy” (Cayrol, 1998:182). Evidence 
can be found in the broad public support for the massive strike in the winter of 1995, 
despite the importance of essentially sectional interests in provoking the mobilisation. 
 
Contrasting polity values can also be seen to have an influence on social protection 
orientations, and thus on the shape of unemployment policy. Van Oorschot has found 
some evidence that suspicion as to the ‘deservingness’ of social transfer beneficiaries 
“seems to be stronger in the Anglo-Saxon individual-oriented countries like the UK, 
US and Australia than in collectively-oriented continental European countries” (Van 
Oorschot, 2000:37). The British and French cases appear to confirm this, and attest to 
the policy implications. For King (1995), the same classically liberal, individualist 
values which underpinned the punitive deterrence approach of the 1834 British Poor 
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Law resurfaced to facilitate the scaling-back of unemployment protection in Britain in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Somewhat confusingly, they can also be considered to have 
underpinned policies which themselves appear inherently illiberal, such as workfare 
(King, 1999). The current Labour government’s ‘New Deal’ programme for the 
unemployed, with its language of ‘balancing rights with responsibilities’, can be seen 
as further evidence of the effectiveness of individualist themes in propping up labour 
market deregulation in Britain. 
 
In France, assistance to the needy was on the contrary identified by the revolutionaries 
as a ‘sacred debt’, and the idea that the state owes assistance to the individual is said 
to underpin the French Republican concepts of fraternity and (national) solidarity. It is 
argued that in the presence of such solidarist reflexes in the electorate, attacks on 
social provision have not been able to provide a pretext for the introduction of greater 
labour market flexibility (Barbier and Theret, 2001). This could be seen to explain, for 
example, why the Jospin government fought so long and hard against the recent 
proposals by the main French employers’ association to attach unemployment benefit 
receipt to ‘return to work’ measures through the Plan d’Aide au Retour à l’Emploi, 
(PARE), even after it had received the support of 3 of the 5 principal union 
confederations. 
 
It is thus suggested that the nexus of social benefit provision and labour market 
regulation tend in Britain and France ever more towards the polarised roles assigned 
to them by Leibfried (1993), respectively ‘work-enforcement’ and ‘first-resort 
compensation’. The end product should ultimately be the transformation of a common 
problem of low growth and rising unemployment into two distinct ‘post golden-age’ 
regulatory profiles, based on low rates of labour market exclusion but high rates of 
‘active poverty’ in the first case, and a permanently large pool of long-term 
unemployed and early retirees in the second. 
 
2. Worlds apart? French and British labour markets in the 1990s 
Certain labour market trends in Britain and France over the 1990s would seem to 
confirm this portrayal of ‘two worlds’, increasingly far apart. As far as the trajectory 
of main unemployment indicators in the 1990s is concerned, the UK and France have 
moved further apart rather than became more similar over time. This is particularly 
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true for overall unemployment, unemployment amongst women and younger people 
(see table 1). In addition, long-term unemployment is about twice as high in France 
than it is in the UK, with no real decline between 1991 and 2000 (4% of the labour 
force) compared with significant decline in the UK (to 1.5%; EC, 2001). 
 
Table 1: Unemployment rates; female unemployment and youth unemployment (%) 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
u F 9.4 9.9 9.5 10.4 11.7 12.3 11.7 12.4 12.3 11.8 11.3 
U UK 7.3 7.0 8.8 10.0 10.5 9.6 8.7 8.2 7.0 6.3 6.1 
Fu F 12.4 11.9 12.1 13.0 13.8 14.5 14.0 14.5 14.4 13.9 13.3 
Fu UK 7.1 6.6 7.5 7.7 8.1 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.3 
Yu F 20.2 19.5 21.3 23.3 27.3 29.2 27.5 29.1 29.2 26.5 24.2 
Yu 
UK 
10.4 10.8 14.4 16.7 18.1 17.0 15.9 15.5 14.2 13.6 13.0 
Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2001 
 
Employment rates have remained very different. Britain has one of the highest rates of 
employment in the EU, climbing (by 2%) to 71% by the end of the 1990s (EC, 2001). 
The French rate rose by about the same margin, which means that the difference 
between the two countries remained about 10% points throughout the past decade. 
About a quarter of the total British workforce works part-time compared to about 17% 
in France. Much of this part time is performed by women. In France about a third of 
all women work part-time and in the UK about 45%. With Spain and Denmark, the 
UK has relatively high rates of short job tenures (less than one year; less than two 
years) compared with other EU countries. By contrast, job tenures in France are above 
the EU average (EC, 2001). 
 
A similar difference marks each countries activity rates, which, for the population 
aged 15 to 64, are higher in the UK (75%) than in France (68%). These differences 
become even more stark once we concentrate our attention on groups at either end of 
the working life. Both younger people and particularly older people in Britain have 
higher activity rates than their French counterparts. This is particularly true for men 
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aged 50 to 64, who have an activity rate of 73% in the UK but only 57% in France, an 
indicator of the effects of the early retirement policies pursued in the latter. 
 
While all the above would tend to confirm the images of ‘two worlds’, in other 
respects the evidence for such outcomes is less convincing. There are some crucial 
variables which suggest that the differences between Britain and France are not as 
categorical as first assumed, that there are functional equivalents and that trends of 
convergence can e observed. Furthermore, in some respects France seems to have 
moved further ahead in terms of creating labour market flexibility than Britain. 
 
Overall activity rates in Britain and France are actually more similar today than at the 
start of the 1990s, particularly for prime age (25-49) men and women (Eurostat, 
2001). The reason for this convergence were growing female activity rates in both 
countries (rising to 63% in France and 68% in the UK by 1999), and a simultaneous 
decline of the male activity rate in the UK (from 86% to 82%). Even among the group 
where differences remain most significant, men aged 50 to 64, there has been some 
convergence, with the 3% fall in activity rates, from 76% to 73%, in the UK between 
1989 and 1999 in reality having no equivalent in France, where the (low) activity rate 
has been stable, at 57%, for the last decade. One implication of such figures is that the 
increasing gap between the French and British unemployment rates in the 1990s could 
be, at least as far as men of prime working age are concerned, partly due to a move 
from unemployment into inactivity rather than employment in Britain. This has been 
shown by Ganßmann (2000:253), who indicates that the decline of measured 
unemployment as a share of non-employment of men aged 25-54 has been much more 
rapid in the UK than in France. 
 
In employment trends, too, there is some evidence of convergence. Rates of female 
part-time employment remain different, as we saw above, but are much less so today 
than at the start of the end of the 1980s. The proportion of British women working 
part-time hardly changed during the entire 1990s, while the rate of French women 
increased by almost a third in the fist half of the decade. Levels of voluntary part-time 
employment are also higher in Britain than in France (EC, 2001). More generally, 
many flexible forms of working are more widespread in France than in Britain, or 
have increased faster in the former than the latter (see table 2). In 2000, fixed-term 
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employment had fallen back to 6% of total employment in Britain, but represented 
14% in France (EC, 2001). 
 
Table 2: ‘Atypical employment’ 1985-1996 
 
 1985 1996 % change 85-96 
 Part-time Fixed-
term 
Part-time Fixed-
term 
Part-time Fixed-
term 
Germany 12.8 10 16.5 11.1 +28.9 +11 
France 10.9 4.7 16 12.6 +46.8 +168.1 
UK 21.2 7 24.6 7.1 +16 +1.4 
USA 18.4 n.a. 18.3 2.2 -0.5 n.a. 
Notes: ‘Part-time’ = part-time employment as a % of all employment; ‘Fixed-term’ = fixed-term contracts as a % of all 
employment contracts. Adapted from Lodivici, (2000), Table 2B, p. 56 
 
While short-employment tenures remain more prevalent in Britain, in terms of 
perceived job security the two states are very close together. The OECD 
(Employment Outlook, 1997) assessed a range of studies on job insecurity across 
countries. While data is not always directly comparable, the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) indicates a high level of employment insecurity in both 
countries. Indeed, a composite indicator suggests that between 1992 and 1996, job 
insecurity in the UK and France had increased to levels which were higher than in any 
other European countries, and close to levels recorded in Japan and the US. 
 
These similarities between Britain and France and counterintuitive differences 
indicate that a characterisation of British and French labour markets and employment 
models are not very well captured by a simple opposition between ‘flexibility’ and 
‘rigidity’. Synthetic indicators of labour market regulation, for example, tend to pose 
as many questions as they answer. Britain has always had a much less regulated 
labour market than the Roman-law states of continental Europe, with their heavy, 
detailed labour codes. Secondly, even if we accept the validity of the comparison, 
much appears to turn on the selection of variables and indicators
1
. Another recent 
                                                 
1 This problem is not unique to indicators of labour market regulation. For example, in two recent 
studies of business conditions carried out by the European Commission and the Economic Intelligence 
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study, differently constructed, shows that France can be considered a more ‘net’ 
structural reformer of the labour market than Britain (Fitoussi and Passet, 2000:50). It 
is no surprise then if, as the previous section has shown, indicators such as 
employment tenure and feelings of job security do not always confirm simple images 
of flexibility or rigidity. 
 
A related point is that the indicators themselves capture a complex reality rather 
poorly, particularly in those states with elaborate labour codes. Global indicators of 
labour market regulation often refer to apparently typical labour market situations 
which are however far from general. The very politically controversial rules which, in 
France, impose heavy obligations on enterprises which have recourse to redundancies, 
but which apply only in enterprises of a certain size under precisely defined 
conditions and thus concern no more than 15% of all ‘economic redundancies’, are a 
case in point. For similar reasons, it is hazardous to make generalisations on the basis 
of the conditions which regulate the ‘standard’ labour contract, which is often taken as 
in some way representative of the degree of labour market regulation. In fact, the 
expansion of ‘atypical’ employment has been the manner in which flexibility has been 
introduced in many European states since the early- to mid-1980s. As shown above, 
the growth of ‘atypical employment’ between 1985 and 1996 was accordingly much 
more dramatic in France than was the case not only in Britain, but also in Germany. 
As the protection offered by a ‘standard’ or ‘typical’ employment relationship is 
relatively low in Britain, there has been less incentive for employers to have recourse 
to atypical employment forms (Deakin and Reed, 2000:124). This observation serves 
to highlight a final difficulty with indicators of labour market regulation, namely that 
in certain contexts the introduction of ‘flexibility’ will be effected by more, not less, 
regulation. 
 
This, it seems to us, is an important part of the French story, where the protections 
associated to the contrat de durée indeterminée (CDI) have been maintained or even 
reinforced, while at the same time labour law has developed new, derogatory 
employment statutes. Alongside part-time employment and regular contrats de durée 
                                                                                                                                            
Unit respectively, Britain came last out of 10 European countries in the first, despite being credited 
with the second best business environment in Europe (and the fourth best in the world) by the second. 
For details, see The Economist, November 24th-30th 2001. 
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dererminée a multiplicity of ‘peripheral’ employment forms – intérim, stages, 
contrats aidés – have also developed, and at moments made up around 10% of all 
salaried employment. Apart from the lower hiring and firing costs they entail, and 
despite being calculated ‘on the basis’ of the minimum wage, many involve low levels 
of remuneration due to the limited number of hours worker per week. Research has 
shown that they are often associated with material poverty and psychological distress 
(Paugam, 2000). The growth of such forms of employment has been one of the 
principal reasons for the emergence, in France, of significant numbers of ‘working 
poor’ (Cocnialdi, 2000). The recent introduction, then augmentation, of a means-
tested in-work benefit, the prime pour l’emploi (PPE), was an explicit recognition of 
this fact in policy. 
 
3. A closer look at unemployment policy and politics in Britain and France 
The PPE, with its apparent similarities to New Labour’s strategy to ‘make work pay’, 
suggests that differences between (un)employment policies in Britain and France may 
be more complex than is suggested by the opposition between ‘workfare’ and ‘social 
treatment of unemployment’. This impression is reinforced when we look at 
conventional unemployment benefits, where the differences are in practice less great 
than suggested by straightforward replacement rates. At the macro-level, the 
percentage of GDP spent on unemployment insurance benefits for each percentage 
point of unemployment was only slightly higher in 1995 in France (0.12) than in 
Britain (0.10), and had fallen further since 1991 in France (from 0.15) than in Britain 
(from 0.12) (IRES, 2000:69). At the micro-level, once housing benefits and other 
means-tested transfers are added, some British household types with below average 
income seem to receive the same or even a slightly higher level of income 
replacement than their French counterparts (OECD, 1999:34). Based on ECHP survey 
data from 1994 (and people who were unemployed throughout 1993), Gallie and 
Paugam (2000:385) also show that (including housing benefit) the gap between the 
UK replacement rate (0.69%) and nine other EU countries is smaller than some 
hypothetical case-based date indicate. While Gallie et. al. (2001) showed that on the 
basis of the first three waves (1994-96) of the ECHP almost half of the British 
unemployed – considerably above the average of the 11 other EU countries covered - 
were poor (having less than 60% of equivalised household median income), the 
equivalent figure for France was for its part over one third. 
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Most interesting of all, however, are the respective profiles of ‘active policies’ in each 
state. If the ‘two regulatory trinities’ outlined above might suggest that it would be 
Britain which has developed an increasingly active labour market policy since the late 
1980s, this is not born out by the data on labour market policy effort. Quite the 
opposite. Ever since the mid-1980s UK spending on active labour market policy has 
been in decline, reaching 0.37% of GDP by 1998. By comparison, France devoted 
1.33% to active programmes in the same year (OECD, 2001). As a percentage of 
GDP France and the UK spent the same (0.16%) on employment services and 
administration in 1998 (OECD, 2001). However, France devoted 4 times as much on 
training and three times as much on youth measures as the UK. Even more tellingly, 
subsidised employment measures did not even register with the British active 
portfolio in 1999, while France spent more than a third of its expenditure on active 
measures on schemes such as job creation and wage subsidies (OECD, 2001). 
 
The New Deal programmes introduced by the Labour government in Britain since 
1998 have not altered this picture significantly. By 1999/2000 they raised total 
spending on active labour market policy by merely one tenth of a percentage point of 
GDP. Since this remained well below expenditure levels earlier in the decade 
(Robinson, 2000:18), the New Deal has done little to reverse the trend in declining 
expenditure on active measures since the 1980s. The New Deal does not, in short, 
represent a radically different approach to British labour market policy, at least in 
spending terms. 
 
The real elements of innovation in the New Deal, which do not show up in 
expenditure data, are related to the further integration between the administrative 
structures for the administration of social benefits, on the one hand, and public 
employment and job-search services, on the other. The New Deal has consolidated a 
trend towards their integration that was initiated with the 1986 ‘Restart’ programme 
and continued in the JSA. This ever greater emphasis on ‘single administrative 
gateways’ for the jobless in Britain contrasts with the situation in France, where co-
ordination between employment and benefit administrations remains, comparatively, 
extremely limited (Clasen et. al., 2001). The initial formulations of the recent PARE 
project promised a greater effort in this respect, but it was precisely these proposals 
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that were the principal victims of the search for a compromise between the social 
partners and the government. 
 
Rather than an absolute opposition between an active strategy of ‘workfare’ and a 
passive strategy of ‘social treatment of unemployment’ in Britain and France 
respectively, then, it seems more accurate to speak of different forms of activation 
which have been privileged in each state. French policy makers have shown a marked 
preference for targeted, programme-based forms of activation, aimed at individuals on 
the fringes of the labour market and who fall outside the scope of unemployment 
insurance. The raft of labour market programmes specifically for the unemployed 
have contributed hugely to the creation of employment statutes which do no more 
than ‘mimic’ the regular employment contract, and as such demonstrate a thinly-
veiled willingness to promote a certain ‘desalarisation’ of employment in France on 
the backs of ‘problem groups’ within the unemployed (Meyer, 1999). At the same 
time, though, France has moved very timidly towards more preventative, and cheaper, 
forms of administrative activation. In Britain, meanwhile, it is the latter that have 
increasingly dominated, to the progressive exclusion of the former. For example, 
while spending on job creation for the unemployed in the non-competitive sector 
represented 25% of all British active labour market policy in 1985, by 1996 it 
represented no more than 2%, the lowest figure in Europe apart from Luxembourg. 
While administration accounted for 22% of expenditure in 1985, by 1996 it 
represented as much as 43%, far above the EU average (19%) (Robinson, 2000). 
 
The explanation for these differences of approach to activation can be argued to lie as 
much in institutional legacies and their political implications as in the influence of 
contrasting values. In France, the principle of a closer integration between the Agence 
Nationale Pour l’Emploi (ANPE) and the unemployment insurance regime, the Union 
Nationale pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le Commerce (UNEDIC), has in reality 
long received considerable elite support, including on parts of the political left. A 
‘single public employment service’, integrating benefit payment, placement and 
training, was among the ‘110 propositions’ on which François Mitterand was elected 
in 1981, and was widely seen to offer a cheap and efficient way of tackling mounting 
unemployment. However, the social partners, and particularly the trade unions, 
remain very attached to the political and organisational resources conferred on them 
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by the autonomous mode of management, known as paritarisme, on which the 
UNEDIC system had been constructed in 1958. The perceived threat to this autonomy 
which was read into the idea of a ‘single public employment service’ meant that its 
implementation risked to be very politically costly, and was quietly shelved. The same 
incompatibility between a doctrinaire paritarisme and a more directive administrative 
treatment of the unemployed is also the best explanation of the government’s 
equivocation over the recent PARE proposal. A careful analysis of the evolution of 
the debate demonstrates that the socialist government was in fact quite positive about 
the proposal when, in its early forms, it appeared to offer a chance for a more organic 
liaison between UNEDIC and the ANPE. It was only once it became clear that the 
PARE was not premised on an abandonment of the social partners’ traditional calls 
for a ‘clarification of responsibilities’ between the state and UNEDIC that the 
government became more hostile. In this form, the PARE would have implied 
subordinating the actions of the ANPE – and a large part of the state’s employment 
policy - to the unilateral decisions of UNEDIC. The government’s eventual agreement 
of the PARE was largely about not wanting to be accused of being hostile to 
paritarisme, and the much watered-down version they accepted in this context as 
much about the maintenance of a fragile equilibrium between the prerogatives of 
UNEDIC and the ANPE as about the defence of the rights of the unemployed (Clegg, 
2002). 
 
The legacy of the historical integration of the social partners in the management of 
social protection in France can also help to explain the preference for expensive, 
programme-based measures. For another effect of the majority of the trade unions’ 
attachment to paritarisme in core spheres of social protection has been their effective 
retreat from a critical engagement in developments at ‘the margin’ of the system 
(Dammame and Jobert, 2000). In this context, the development and multiplication of 
derogatory employment statutes for the large number of unemployed who are without 
insurance-based rights has generally been politically cheap for successive French 
governments. A similar observation could be made about the insertion requirement 
attached, in principle, to the 1988 Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI) minimum-
income programme, whose presentation in generous terms by policy makers’ was 
never really challenged by the union movement, who indeed were largely absent from 
debates over the RMI. Neither have the majority of union confederations supported 
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the calls by associations of the unemployed themselves, and some isolated socialist 
MPs, for the extension of rights to a minimum income to young (under 25) people. 
 
The state-centred administrative structure of the post-war British welfare state 
excluded social actors from managerial responsibilities in all the principal domains of 
social policy. This has been considered to have increased its vulnerability to 
politically and economically motivated changes because organised labour, the 
principle historical defenders of social rights, have neither immediate organisational 
interests to focus their energies, nor the possibility to enrich a social argumentation 
centred on the defence of social rights with a libertarian one centred on the 
prerogatives of ‘civil society’. However, while British governments have gained from 
this situation in steering capacity at ‘the centre’ of the system (Crouch, 1999), they 
have arguably paid for this in a limited compliance at ‘the margins’ than seems to 
exist, albeit implicitly, in France. 
 
This has had a significant impact on the cost of policy initiatives in the domain of 
unemployment. While Conservative governments in the 1980s developed large, 
targeted active labour market programmes in the 1980s which rivalled in expenditure 
terms those existing in France, they were constantly and systematically criticised by 
organised labour, who were quick to denounce them as ‘workfare’. Economically 
expensive, they were thus also politically so. It was therefore in some ways logical 
that British governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s should turn to more 
administrative solutions which, if no less denounced by the unions and the opposition, 
had the advantage of placing considerably less of a burden on the taxpayer. 
 
Even these relatively inexpensive forms of activation remained limited until the 
arrival of New Labour in 1997. The skill of Tony Blair’s government has arguably 
been to profit from a favourable macro-economic environment and what remains of 
his party’s ‘social’ reputation to further rehabilitate the legitimacy of an active 
approach to unemployment policy on the political left and centre (Clasen, 2001), 
building on a transformation which had begun around the time of the Commission on 
Social Justice (CSJ) in the mid-1990s. It remains the case, however, that a more 
determined resurrection of intensive, programme-based measures – like the Jobs, 
Employment and Training (JET) programme imagined by the CSJ - will require a 
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much greater budgetary commitment than New Labour have been prepared to accept 
until now, and thus a potentially expensive appeal to a British taxpayer who has 
become particularly averse to paying for social expenditure, ‘productive’ or 
otherwise. 
 
Conclusion 
It can be said that in the 1990s, Britain and France have both moved increasingly 
towards an unemployment policy based on activation, but in forms which reflect, to a 
great extent, different political incentive structures. The political implications of 
differentially institutionalised interests in social and unemployment protection have in 
this way driven unemployment policy in Britain and France in different, but not 
opposing, directions. If the model of ‘two regulatory trinities’ also emphasises 
institutional factors, its error is to underplay the multiplicity and complexity of 
institutional effects, and too quickly assimilate institutional variation to value 
difference. In this respect, the specific institutions of social and unemployment 
protection can be seen as a template for the effects of institutions in general, which are 
never unidirectional. This helps to explain why adjustment to a new economic 
environment has produced responses in Britain and France which are distinctive, but 
not altogether ‘worlds apart’ in either economic or social terms, and which cannot be 
contrasted in a simple (or simplistic) way. 
 
As Britain and France are usually considered to lie at opposing ends of the value 
spectrum in Europe, seeing their unemployment policy choices as simply the 
‘cheapest’ options available suggests that the European Commission’s recent embrace 
of bench-marking in the domain of unemployment and labour market policy may not, 
after all, be doomed to failure. Both British and French policy makers could 
undoubtedly benefit from building on each others’ experience and developing more 
composite activation policy profiles. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
‘open method of co-ordination’ will be enough to encourage them to compliment their 
adjustment strategies with more ‘expensive’ initiatives. 
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